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THE VERTICAL INTEGRATION OF CONTENT AND BROADBAND 




Whether broadband service providers should be allowed to vertically integrate with content providers is 
a contentious issue, especially from the net neutrality perspective, since the vertically integrated firm can 
prioritize the delivery of its own content at the expense of that of its competitors if net neutrality is not 
enforced. We analyze the issues of vertical integration of content and broadband services surrounding 
this debate from an economic perspective, using a game-theoretic model. Our analysis establishes the 
various equilibria in the game, and shows that if net neutrality is not enforced, social welfare might – 
depending on parameter values – increase or decrease with vertical integration. Interestingly, we find 
that it is not always true that the ISP will always degrade the delivery of the competing content, and in 
fact will sometimes have the incentive to prioritize the latter over its own.  
Keywords: Net Neutrality, Economics of Net Neutrality, Vertical Integration, Broadband Service 





The issue of net neutrality received widespread media attention when some broadband providers like 
Verizon, Comcast and AT&T (among others) proposed to charge popular online websites for priority 
delivery of the latter’s content to their residential and commercial customers (Helm 2006, Waldmeir 
2006). The proposal encountered stiff resistance from those who were supposed to be charged, and thus 
erstwhile competitors like Google, Yahoo! and Microsoft were soon lobbying before the United States 
Congress to pass legislation that would prevent the Internet service providers (ISPs) from carrying out 
their proposed plan (WSJ 2006), and thereby maintain what was termed the ‘neutrality’ of the Internet 
(the term ‘net neutrality’ itself is attributed to the Columbia Law School professor Tim Wu). This would 
involve the designing of “rules that prevent network operators and ISPs from using their power over the 
transmission technology to negatively affect competition in complementary markets for applications, 
content and portals” (van Schewick 2007). 
The supporters of net neutrality believe that a “maximally useful public information network aspires to 
treat all content, sites, and platforms equally” (Wu 2003), and while a formal definition of the 
operationalization of the principle does not exist, Hahn and Wallsten (2006) point out that it “usually 
means that broadband service providers charge consumers only once for Internet access, do not favor one 
content provider over another, and do not charge content providers for sending information over 
broadband lines to end users.” 
As is to be expected in a debate which has implications in many different areas, academicians too can be 
found on both sides of the debate (for a recent example of such debate, see (van Schewick and Farber 
2009), for example). The issues that are germane to the research in this paper are economic in nature. As 
Economides and Tag (2007) point out, in sharp contrast to the large amount of literature that discusses the 
legal issues surrounding net neutrality, there is a surprising lack of rigorous economic analysis of the net 
neutrality debate. For a comprehensive analysis, we need to consider the strategic interactions between 
the three players involved in this issue: the content providers, who jockey for a position in the consumers' 
minds; the consumers, who gain utility by consuming the content of the content providers but endure the 
disutility of congestion by waiting for this content; and the Internet service provider, who charges the 
consumers for access to the content, and, depending on the legislation on this issue, can decide to charge 
the content providers for preferential treatment of the latter's content – all within a two-sided market 
framework. 
Cheng, et al. (2009) consider the effect of competition among content providers by limiting the number of 
content providers to two, who do not effectively differ in quality, but are differentiated from each other in 
terms of consumers’ content preferences in a Hotelling sense. They find that net neutrality can sometimes 
result in lower social welfare in the short run, but when capacity expansion is an endogenous choice (i.e. 
in the long run) in the model, the ISPs have a higher incentive to expand under net neutrality in most 
scenarios, thus undermining one of the key arguments of the opponents of net neutrality – that ISPs will 
not have sufficient incentive to expand capacity under net neutrality. 
The literature on net neutrality thus far – especially those which look at the issue from an economic 
perspective – look at the problem assuming that the ISP and the content providers are separate entities 
with conflicting objectives, with the two standing on opposing sides in this debate. However, recent 
developments indicate that the issue might not be that clearly delineated: broadband service providers like 
Comcast and AT&T have struck deals with online content providers whereby the latter provides exclusive 
co-branded content through the former’s ‘pipes’. For example, Comcast and Yahoo! recently signed a 
multi-year agreement so that the latter can display its advertisements to the end consumers who subscribe 
 
 
to the former’s broadband services (Shields 2007). As industry observers have noted, abolishing net 
neutrality might provide the incentive to the ISP to generate their own content (or equivalently, have a 
strategic relationship with a content provider) and then prioritize delivery of such content to the end 
consumers. If net neutrality is not enforced, and the ISP’s in these examples are allowed to prioritize 
content from their strategic partner, a section of the consumers might switch from their erstwhile content 
provider to the ISP’s strategic partner. A similar scenario can ensue with other classes of service like 
news, VoIP telephony, music streaming, etc. 
These developments prompt a new set of questions for the policymaker: 
1. What are the possible different equilibrium outcomes when ISP is vertically integrated with a 
content provider? 
2. How does such vertical integration affect consumer surplus and social welfare? 
3. Will the vertically integrated firm prefer no net neutrality over net neutrality? 
In this paper, we endogenize the ISP’s vertical integration decision in the context of the net neutrality 
debate to answer these questions. In our model, we assume that there is a monopolist ISP who gets into a 
strategic relationship with an online content provider to provide an online service that competes with that 
from a pure play competitor. The latter has to depend on the ISP’s infrastructure for getting its content 
delivered to the end consumers. We assume that the content providers get reimbursed through an 
advertisement-supported revenue model that allows them to provide their service to the end consumers for 
free (this revenue model is further expanded upon in the next section). 
Our analysis shows that depending on the effectiveness of the vertically integrated ISP in generating 
revenue as compared to its competitor, consumer surplus and social welfare may increase or decrease as 
compared to the equivalent scenarios when the ISP is not vertically integrated. Further, our analysis also 
indicates that given the choice, the vertically integrated ISP does not ever have the incentive to abide by 
the principles of net neutrality. Consumers sometimes gain from arrangements with lower access charges, 
while the rival pure play content provider is never better off. We find that interestingly it is not always 
true that the ISP will always degrade the delivery of the competing content, and in fact might sometimes 
prioritize the content of its competitor over its own. 
The rest of the paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 develops the theoretical model on which our 
analysis is based. Section 3 analyzes the three players’ decisions under net neutrality (which we denote as 
NN for short) and Section 4 analyzes their decisions with no net neutrality (or NNN for short). Section 5 
examines the welfare impact of net neutrality in the context of vertical integration. Section 6 concludes 
with a discussion of our findings and their implications. 
2 THE MODEL 
In this section we set up a game-theoretic model to analyze the impact of vertical integration between 
content provider and broadband service provider in the absence of net neutrality. There are three types of 
players in the game – the vertically integrated monopolist ISP, the two content providers (one of whom 
shares a strategic relationship with the ISP) and the end consumers. The ISP serves as an intermediary and 
transmits content from the content providers to end consumers. Since the ISP is vertically integrated, it 
has its own content (from its strategic partner) that competes with the other independent content provider 
(we call the independent content provider C) for the attention of the end consumers. 
As stated earlier, we assume a monopolist ISP delivering the digital content from its local switching 
office to the end consumers. While the monopoly assumption is a simplification in some geographies, it is 
to be noted that unlike many other countries, the extent of competition in the local broadband services 
market is very limited in the United States, so much so that in many places, a single broadband service 
 
 
provider is often a de facto monopolist (Economides 2008, Hausman, et al. 2001). Some of the factors 
leading to this scenario are the high switching costs induced by long-term service contracts and by 
incompatible broadband technologies between cable and phone companies. Further, many customers are 
not qualified for digital subscriber’s line (DSL) broadband services from phone companies because they 
exceed the three miles distance limit from the phone company’s nearest switching office, making the 
cable operators the only feasible broadband service providers in several local markets (Turner 2007). 
Thus, in addition to providing the benefit of making the analysis tractable, the assumption closely reflects 
the reality of local broadband services in the U.S. market. As is common in the online world nowadays, 
we assume that the content providers provide their content to the consumers for “free” and get 
compensated indirectly in a stochastic sense from “a revenue-generating component somewhere in the 
value chain” (McKinseyQuarterly 2009). This revenue model follows what many researchers, from 
economists like Hal Varian (McKinseyQuarterly 2009) and Paul Krugman (2008), to IS researchers like 
Eric Clemons (Knowledge@Wharton 2008) think is the way digital content would be paid for as their 
marginal cost is driven towards zero. 
2.1 Broadband Service Provider 
Following the central tenets of the model in (Cheng, et al. 2009), we assume a monopolist ISP who 
provides Internet access as well as its own content to the end consumers. The ISP can provide its content 
as a result of a vertical integration with a content provider – the exact mechanism for this integration 
might be achieved through an outright merger between the two firms, or through a strategic alliance.1 The 
mechanism of this integration is discussed later in the text. Figure 1 shows a schematic of the market 














Figure 1. Market structure 
The ISP charges the consumers a fixed fee F  for Internet access and potentially charges content provider 
C a usage-based fee p  for preferential delivery of C’s data packets if net neutrality is not enforced. In this 
                                              
1 The details of the profit-sharing agreement between the two firms in a strategic alliance are not germane to this discussion, since 
what we are concerned about is the effect on social surplus. 
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context, we note that the technology to discriminate packets and streamline Internet traffic has been 
available at minimal fixed cost, and we therefore assume that there is no additional expense incurred by 
the ISP to implement a mechanism that enables preferential delivery of content (Cheng, et al. 2009). The 
ISP’s capacity is denoted by µ. 
2.2 Content Provider 
To model the competition between the content providers, we assume two content providers L and H who 
offer their basic services for free to the end consumers. We assume that the content from these two 
providers are horizontally differentiated in a Hotelling sense with the two of them located on the two ends 
of line segment 
[ ]0,1
. The content providers get compensated when the consumers interact with 
advertisers and other revenue generation mechanisms on the content providers’ web sites. Examples of 
such revenue generation mechanisms include banner advertisements, affiliate revenues, rental of 
subscription lists, sale of aggregate information, licensing, live events, listing, paid inclusion, cost per 
install, getting users to create content for free, streaming audio and video advertising, and API fees, to 
name a few (Wilson 2008). We capture this revenue model of the two content providers through two 
separate variables which represent the average revenue generated (from all sources) per packet requested 
by the end consumer, Hr and Lr , where, without loss of generality H Lr r> . These two variables denote the 
revenue rates of the two content providers respectively per packet for content – in other words, these two 
parameters denote the average rates at which the requests for content from the consumers provide 
revenues to the content providers from myriad third parties who want to reach these consumers. As is 
observed in real life, content providers differ in their ability to get the “right” consumers for their 
respective advertisers (and other revenue sources) and therefore end up charging different advertising 
(and other) fees. 
The ISP has two decisions to make: (a) whether it would like to have a strategic relationship with one of 
the two content providers and (b) if so, which one. We denote the revenue generation rate of the vertically 
integrated ISP by ISPr and the revenue generation rate of the independent content provider C, where 
C {H,L}∈ , as Cr . Thus, ISP Hr r=  and C Lr r= if the ISP vertically integrates with H, and ISP Lr r=  and 
C Hr r= if the ISP vertically integrates with L. Therefore, depending on the ISP’s choice, ISPr can be either 
greater than or less than Cr . The competition between content provider C and the ISP is driven by the fact 
that a larger consumer base will lead to greater advertising revenue. 
2.3 Consumers 
Consumers request content from either the ISP or content provider C. We model the congestion in the 
network after (Bandyopadhyay and Cheng 2006, Mendelson 1985), and accordingly, consumers’ request 
for data packets follows a Poisson process with arrival rate λ . The gross valuation consumers receive is 
denoted by 
( )V λ
. Consumers face a delay cost due to network congestion during the data transmission 
process. We note that the issue of net neutrality ceases to be one if consumers do not experience any 
delay: if the ISP cannot credibly speed up content in lieu of a fee, then the problem would not exist. As 
noted in the afore-mentioned literature, we assume an M/M/1 queue to model the data transmission 
service provided by the ISP. Then the time spent in the system by a data packet is 
1
µ λ−  (with net 




µ λ−  where d  is the delay parameter that captures the unit cost of delay for consumers waiting for the 
content to arrive from the content providers. As discussed earlier, the consumers are uniformly distributed 
on 
[ ]0,1
 in terms of their preferences for content (as shown in Figure 2), with an associated fit cost. For 
an arbitrary consumer 
[ ]0,1x∈%
, the fit cost associated with deviation from his ideal content is tx%  if the 
consumer chooses the ISP’s content and 
( )1t x− %
 if the consumer chooses content from provider C. Then 
the utility function for the ISP’s consumers under net neutrality is: 
 
( ) ( )NN_ISP
d
u x V tx Fλ
µ λ




The utility function for content provider C’s consumers under net neutrality is: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )NN_C 1
d
u x V t x Fλ
µ λ




We define two indicator functions as follows to represent whether the ISP would prioritize its own 




Figure 2. Content competition between the ISP and content provider C 
 
 
{ISP 1, The ISP prioritizes its own content0, The ISP does not prioritize its own contentI =
 (3) 
 
{C 1, Content provider C pays for the preferential delivery0, Content provider C does not pay for the preferential deliveryI =
 (4) 
The timing of the four-stage game is as shown in Figure 3. 
Figure 3. The four-stage game 
In stage 1, the ISP decides (a) whether to integrate and (b) if so, integrate with whom. In stage 2, the 
broadband provider announces F  and p . In stage 3, content provider C chooses to “Pay” or “Not Pay” 
for the preferential delivery and the ISP decides whether to give its own content preferential treatment. In 
stage 4, consumers choose content from either the ISP or content provider C. Given this particular timing, 
0 (ISP) 1 (C)x, marginal consumer 
The ISP 
announces 
F and p 
Stage 2 
Content provider C chooses “Pay” or 
“Not Pay” for the preferential delivery; 
The ISP decides whether to give its own 
content preferential treatment 
Stage 3 
Consumers choose 
content from the ISP 
or content provider C 
Stage 4 
The ISP decides (a) 
whether to integrate 
and (b) if so, 




the strategy of the ISP is to calculate its optimum profit under different scenarios, and then, depending on 
the underlying parameter values (see Appendix A for a list of the various parameters and variables used in 
the text), choose whether to observe net neutrality, or – if the regulatory environment allows him to do so 
– choose to prioritize its own content and (for a fee) the content from provider C to the end consumers. 
Thus, the monopolist ISP can calculate what would be the profit under different scenarios and then 
choose that particular pricing strategy that will maximize its profit for a given set of parameter values. In 
the following sections 3 and 4, we analyze these different scenarios by maximizing the ISP’s profit 
objective under different regulatory regimes (net neutrality and no net neutrality) and pricing 
arrangements. Note that there is only one pricing decision under net neutrality (the access price that the 
ISP charges the consumers), while under no net neutrality, the ISP can charge both the consumers and the 
content provider C (charging the latter for the service that prioritizes the delivery of its content to the end 
consumers). 
3 NET NEUTRALITY  
 
With net neutrality in place, the ISP is forbidden from providing the service of and charging for 
preferential delivery of data packets. Then the marginal consumer who is indifferent from the ISP and 
content provider C can be determined by ( ) ( )NN_ISP NN NN_C NNu x u x= , i.e., 
 
NN NN NN NN( ) ( ) (1 )
d d
V tx F V t x Fλ λ
µ λ µ λ


















. The ISP’s revenue consists of both Internet 












4 NO NET NEUTRALITY 
Without net neutrality, the ISP has the option to provide a preferential delivery for data packets from 
content provider C and the ISP itself. Depending on whether the ISP prioritizes its own content and 
whether C pays for the preferential delivery, there are four different outcomes: (1) C does not pay for 
priority delivery of its own content, and content from neither provider is prioritized (Outcome 1); (2) the 
ISP prioritizes its own content at the expense of that of C who does not pay the priority delivery fee 
(Outcome 2); (3) the ISP prioritizes C’s content for a fee so that the latter’s content is prioritized at the 
expense of its own (Outcome 3); and (4) C pays the ISP so that the ISP does not prioritize its own content 
over that of C (in other words, content from both providers receive the same priority) (Outcome 4). Note 
that all these four outcomes are under the “control” of the ISP – for example, if it is charging C for 
priority delivery, it can create a contract that specifies whether it will in turn not prioritize its own content 
(i.e. Outcome 3), or whether the payment from C merely ensures that C’s packets are not relatively “de-
prioritized” with respect to its own (which is Outcome 4). We note further that a priori, none of the 
                                              
2 The subscripts for the parameter x denoting the indifferent consumer signify the different “regimes” under which the analysis is 
done. Thus, the subscript NN denotes net neutrality, while the subscripts 1 through 4 that appear later in the text signify the four 
different scenarios under no net neutrality. 
 
 
outcomes can be ruled out, since based on the values of the different parameters, any one of them might 
generate the highest profit for the ISP. 
 
Outcome 1: The ISP does not prioritize its own content and content provider C does not pay for the 
preferential delivery (
ISP C 0I I= = ). 
Outcome 1 is essentially the equilibrium under net neutrality. The corresponding marginal 
consumer 
1x  is determined by ( ) ( )ISP1 1 C1 1u x u x= , i.e., 
 ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1 11
d d
V tx F V t x Fλ λ
µ λ µ λ
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u x x x










% %  (7) 
where the first two constraints are consumers’ participation constraints and the last two are incentive 
compatibility constraints for the ISP and content provider C. Note that for its incentive compatibility 
considerations, the ISP compares its profit under Outcome 1 with that under Outcome 2 (where it 
prioritizes its own content over that of C). To consider the incentive compatibility constraint of content 
provider C, meanwhile, the ISP will need to compare C’s profit under Outcome 1 to that under Outcome 
3 – when it prioritizes C’s content at the expense of its own. 
  
Some algebra shows that regardless of parameter values, the incentive compatibility constraint for the ISP 
can never be satisfied. In other words, if content provider C does not have the incentive to pay for the 
preferential delivery, the ISP is always better off to prioritize its own content (see Table 1 for a 
comparison of the ISP’s profits under the different scenarios). Therefore Outcome 1 is not an equilibrium, 
unless the ISP is prohibited through regulation from differentially prioritizing content. 
 
Outcome 2: Under Outcome 2, the ISP finds it optimal to prioritize its own content and content provider 
C does not have the incentive to pay for the preferential delivery (
ISP C1, 0I I= = ). 
In this case, data packets provided by the ISP and content provider C are transmitted with different 
priorities by the ISP. We use a two-class priority queue with preemption model to depict the waiting time. 




 while data 
packets from content provider C are transmitted with lower priority whose waiting time is 
( )( )2x
µ
µ λ µ λ− −
. Correspondingly the marginal consumer 
2x  is determined by ( ) ( )ISP2 2 C2 2u x u x= , i.e., 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )( )2 2 2 22 2
1
d d




µ λ µ λ µ λ
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The ISP maximizes its profit by solving 
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s.t. ( ) 0, 0
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% %  (9) 
where, just as in formulation (7), the first two constraints are consumers’ participation constraints and the 
last two are incentive compatibility constraints for the ISP and content provider C. Note that if Outcome 2 
holds, then the ISP does not generate any revenue from priority delivery, since the only content that is 
prioritized is from its strategic partner. In this scenario, in order to ensure C’s incentive compatibility 
constraint to hold true, the ISP will need to ensure that C’s profit under this outcome when it does not pay 
the ISP (so that its content gets lower priority for delivery than the ISP’s content) is at least as high as it is 
under Outcome 4, when C pays to ensure that the delivery of its content will not be relatively degraded 
with respect to the ISP’s own content. 
 




> + − , i.e. the ISP can have an incentive to offer 
this pricing/prioritization policy only if it is also the “sufficiently” more profitable content provider (since 
the online content provider’s marginal cost of providing content can be approximated to zero, the relative 
profitability of the two content providers can be measured from their revenues). If however 




≤ + − 3, Outcome 2 is dominated by other scenarios. 
 
Outcome 3: The ISP does not prioritize its own content and content provider C pays for the preferential 
delivery (
ISP C0, 1I I= = ). 
As opposed to Outcome 2, in Outcome 3 it is the data packets from content provider C that are 
transmitted with higher priority with a waiting time of 
( )3
1
1 xµ λ− −
 while data packets from the ISP are 
transmitted with lower priority with waiting time of 
( ) ( )31 x
µ
µ λ µ λ − −  − 
. Correspondingly the 
marginal consumer under Outcome 3, 
3x  is determined by ( ) ( )ISP3 3 C3 3u x u x= , i.e., 
 ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
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maximize its profit by solving 
                                              
3 We assume that when the ISP is indifferent between two different outcomes (i.e. between Outcome 2 and Outcome 4, or 
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Now, in order to satisfy its own incentive compatibility constraints, the ISP has to make sure that its 
profits under Outcome 3, when C pays and the delivery of its own content is degraded with respect to that 
of C, is at least as high as under Outcome 4, when C pays and the content from both providers receive 
equal priority. Note that depending on the relative magnitudes of the average per-consumer advertising 
revenue that is generated by the ISP and C, the ISP will sometimes willingly degrade delivery of its own 
content (Outcome 3) in order to extract the surplus from the advertising revenue that C generates from its 
bigger market share. The additional surplus extracted from C might be enough to more than compensate 
the loss of revenue from the loss of market share (compared to Outcome 4). In order to satisfy C’s 
incentive compatibility constraints, the ISP has to ensure that by paying and getting priority delivery of its 
packets, C ensures that its profit is at least as high as under Outcome 1, when it does not pay and the 
delivery of its content does not receive priority (but is not degraded either). 
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,  i.e. 
the ISP can have an incentive to offer this pricing policy only if it is the “sufficiently” less profitable 









≤ + − 
− 
, Outcome 3 is dominated by other 
scenarios. We also note that since the independent content provider is more effective in generating 
revenue, the ISP can credibly enforce this pricing/prioritization strategy where content provider C has 
reasons to believe that the ISP will relative degrade its own content’s delivery, since by doing so, it can 
extract part of the surplus that the content provider C will generate from the enhanced market share. 
 
Outcome 4: Here, the ISP prioritizes its own content and content provider C pays for the preferential 
delivery (
ISP C 1I I= = ) to ensure that its own packets do not get degraded with respect to those of the ISP 
as in Outcome 2. 
In Outcome 4, data packets from both the ISP and content provider C get “preferential” delivery – 
in other words, delivery of neither content is degraded with respect to the other. Therefore, packets from 
provider face the same waiting time 
1
µ λ−
. So the marginal consumer 
4x  is determined by 
( ) ( )ISP4 4 C4 4u x u x= , i.e., 
 ( ) ( ) ( )4 4 4 41
d d
V tx F V t x Fλ λ
µ λ µ λ
− − − = − − − −
− −
 (12) 
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For the ISP, the scenario is the reverse of Outcome 3, and hence, to maintain incentive compatibility, the 
ISP has to ensure that its profit under Outcome 4 is at least as high as under Outcome 3. For content 
provider C, there remains an incentive to pay the ISP only if by doing so (and thereby not have the 
delivery of its content degraded with respect to those of the ISP as in Outcome 2), it can generate profits 
that are as high as under Outcome 2. 
 
With respect to the regions outlined in Figure 4, Outcome 4 is the equilibrium in the region in between 
that of Outcome 2 and Outcome 3. This is where the profitability of the ISP and the content provider is 
relatively “comparable”. We note that the fixed fee is higher compared to that in Outcomes 2 and 3, and 
the ISP now gets relatively more of its profit from the consumers than from the content providers as 
compared to Outcomes 2 and 3. 
 
Proposition 1 summarizes the results of equilibrium of the game. 
 
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium of the game): There are three possible equilibria of the game. 




< − − , Outcome 2 is the equilibrium; 









> + − 
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, Outcome 3 is the equilibrium; 
Under Case C ( ) ( )3ISP 3 C ISP 3
3
1
1 2 1 2
1 2
xt t
r x r r x
xλ λ
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− − ≤ ≤ + − 
− 
, Outcome 4 is the equilibrium. Case C 
can be further divided into two sub-cases: 
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−
. 
Proof: Complete derivations of the proofs lie with the authors. 
 
We note that though 3x appears in the expressions in Proposition 1, it is completely determined by the 




Figure 4 shows graphically the effect of the relative magnitudes of 
Cr and ISPr  on the final equilibrium. 
We can think of the graph being divided into two areas by the line 
C ISPr r= , with the bottom half 
corresponding to the case when the vertically integrated ISP is more profitable in generating advertising 
revenue than its pure play competitor, while the top half represents the opposite scenario. The figure can 
be divided into three main regions, which we denote as Case A, B and C respectively, and Case C can be 
further divided into two regions C1 and C2. The shaded region in the bottom half of the quadrant 
represents Case A, or Outcome 2. The other shaded region, which is in the top half of the quadrant 
represents Case B, or Outcome 3. The remaining area represents Case C, or Outcome 4. 
 
As noted earlier, Case A or Case B occurs only when the relative revenue generation rates 
Cr and ISPr are 
“sufficiently” different from one another (the exact magnitude of the difference necessary is given by the 
straight lines that demarcate the different regions). When the revenue generation rates are relatively 
“comparable”, Outcome 4, or Case C, dominates. In this scenario, the ISP can credibly ask for 
compensation from its competitor content provider as an assurance for not prioritizing its (the ISP’s) own 
content over that of content provider C. It is instructive to compare this outcome with that of Case B. In 
the latter case, the ISP, which is relatively much less profitable in generating revenue from its own 
content than its competitor, finds it to its advantage to prioritize its competitor’s content relative to its 
own and then extract the surplus from the latter which has a higher market share, than to give its content 
the same priority as that of its competitor (which it does under Case C, when the ISP is relatively more 
profitable). 
 
The two regions in Case C, C1 and C2, warrant a separate explanation. The level of the priority access fee 
p is determined by two constraints: (1) it has to be low enough to attract content provider C to pay and (2) 
as opposed to Case B discussed above, p has to be low enough so that the ISP does not have the incentive 
to degrade the delivery of its own content. Case C1 denotes the region where constraint 1 binds, while 
Case C2 denotes the region where constraint 2 binds. 
 
We end this section with a discussion of the implications of Case A and B. Under Case A, the ISP 
prioritizes its own content at the expense of its competitor, who prefers not to pay for that privilege. The 
ISP thus gets an advantage over its competitor without the requirement of a comparable rent, and this is 
something that should definitely be of interest to a policymaker deliberating on this issue, since such an 
arrangement might be tantamount to unfair competition. Under Case B, we have an outcome which looks 
counter-intuitive at first sight: the ISP deliberately de-prioritizes its own content with respect to its 
competitor in exchange for a fee. As the discussion in the previous paragraph indicates, this outcome is 
actually credible: the ISP gains more from the fee from its competitor (who has a higher market share) 
than it would have generated from the advertising revenue of its own content (and commanding the same 




Figure 4. The equilibria with vertical integration 
 
5 THE WELFARE EFFECT OF NET NEUTRALITY WITH VERTICAL 
INTEGRATION 
We have already observed that given the choice, the ISP will never opt for abiding by the principles of net 
neutrality – in other words, unless enforced, net neutrality will never be a natural outcome of the game. It 
is imperative therefore from a regulatory perspective to find out whether it is in the best interests of the 
other players (the content providers and the consumers), as well as in terms of the total social welfare, to 
regulate enforcement of network neutrality. This section is devoted to that discussion – we discuss the 
impact of net neutrality (or its abolishment) on the payoffs to the three players and the overall welfare. 
Proposition 2 summarizes the findings. 
 
Proposition 2 (The welfare impact of net neutrality): Comparing the results of NNN to NN, we get the 
following: 
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), both consumer surplus and 
social welfare remain unchanged. 
 
The expressions of consumer surplus and social welfare are provided in Table 1, which shows the 
comparison of the prices charged by the ISP, the profits of the ISP and that of the content provider C, the 
consumer surplus and the total social surplus under NN and in the three potential equilibria under NNN 
(which we denoted earlier as Cases A, B and C respectively). Case C is in turn divided into two subcases 
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C1 and C2, as discussed in the previous section. Table 1 also shows the result of comparing the 
magnitude of these output variables under the different scenarios of NNN to that under NN, and in all the 
cases, we establish how the expressions compare regardless of input parameter values. 
 
As can be seen from Table 1, the consumers’ access fees are lower with NNN than with NN under Cases 
A and B and unchanged under Case C. The corresponding consumer surpluses are higher under Cases A 
and B as compared to NN, and unchanged under Case C. Similarly, the total social welfare with vertical 
integration increases with NNN under Cases A and B as compared to NN, while it is unchanged in Case 
C.  
 
The vertically integrated ISP’s surplus is always higher under NNN, and therefore the ISP will always 
prefer NNN over NN. 
 
The expressions in Table 1 establish that the content provider C has either the same surplus (Case B) or is 
worse off under NNN. Interestingly, content provider C has the same surplus in Case B that it has under 
NN, even though it has a higher market share than under NN – this is so because the ISP is able to extract 
the additional surplus from C completely through the priority access fee. In Case A, content provider C 
has a lower market share than under NN, and consequently a lower surplus. In Case C, content provider C 
and the ISP have the same market share as under NN, but as a result of the priority access fee, content 




The issue of net neutrality has wide implications for the ways that online content will be created, 
delivered and consumed in the near future. If the local ISP has control over the infrastructure that delivers 
this online content to end users, it can effectively regulate the choices of the end consumers. This is 
possible since the ‘pipe’ by which the content is delivered to the end users has limited bandwidth, and 
therefore prioritizing some specific content for delivery automatically leads to increased delay for the rest 
of the non-prioritized content. Even though a lot of literature exists that analyzes the various facets of the 
net neutrality problem, most of the analyses focus on the legal and regulatory perspectives of the debate. 
In contrast, the research by Economides and Tag (2007) or Cheng , et al. (2009) represent some of the few 
papers that concentrate on the economic issues surrounding the debate, and analyze them rigorously 
within an analytical framework. This paper contributes to that stream of economic literature, by looking 
into the incentives of the various players involved and analyzing them using a game-theoretic model, 
looking specifically into the issue of vertical integration between the ISP and a content provider. 
 
We find that whether social welfare increases or decreases crucially depends on whether the ISP is 
integrated with the more or less effective content provider (effectiveness in this case being defined as the 
ability to generate advertising revenue from the consumer base). If the vertically integrated firm is 
relatively less effective in generating revenue from its content, we find that for a range of parameter 
values, the social welfare decreases as compared to a situation when there is no vertical integration. On 
the other hand, social welfare can actually increase if the ISP is vertically integrated with the more 
effective content provider. But in either case, the competing content provider is often left worse off (and 
is never better off). 
 
Future research can look at the effects of vertical integration in the long run, and explore whether the 
competing content providers are driven out of the market. Other possible areas of exploration include 




Table 1: Comparison of various economic outcomes of interest under NN and NNN 
(The bold and italicized text shows how those economic outcomes change when moving from NN to NNN) 
NNN (Case C:  Outcome 4 – Both the ISP and C’s 
content are equally prioritized)  NN (Benchmark) 
NNN (Case A: Outcome 2 
– Only the ISP’s content 
is prioritized) 
NNN (Case B:  Outcome 3 – Only 
C’s content is prioritized) 
Case C1 CaseC2 
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Appendix A: List of notations 
 
x : the marginal consumer indifferent between content providers ISP and C 
x% : an arbitrary consumer on [ ]0,1  
ISPr : the ISP’s revenue rate per packet request for content 
Cr : content provider C’s revenue rate per packet request for content 
p: the per packet price for priority data packet transmission 
ISPI , CI : the ISP’s and content provider C’s service choices 
λ : Poisson arrival rate of content requested from each consumer in packets per unit of time 
t : fit cost parameter for an end consumer away from the ideal content 
( )V λ : the gross value function of retrieving content for each consumer; concave and twice-
differentiable 
d: customers’ delay cost parameter (i.e., congestion cost) per unit of time 
NN_ISPu , NN_Cu , ISPiu , Ciu : consumers’ utility function 
F: the fixed fee per unit of time charged by the broadband provider to the end consumers 
µ : capacity of the broadband provider in packets per unit of time 
NNx : the marginal consumer indifferent between ISP and content provider C under net neutrality 
ix : the marginal consumer indifferent between ISP and content provider C in Outcome 1,2,3,4i =  
under no net neutrality 
ISPiπ : ISP’s profit in Outcome 1,2,3,4i =  
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